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1. Introduction
In 1987 Ergas introduced the concepts of mission- and diffusion-oriented policy designs to
classify and analyse national systems of innovation. According to him, mission-oriented sys-
tems are characterised by centralisation and the concentration of policy support on a small
number of technologies and larger firms, unlike diffusion-oriented systems which concentrate
their policy efforts on increasing an economy’s capacity of innovating by concentrating on the
scientific infrastructure, technology transfer and cooperation, i.e. formal and informal
relationships between different actors etc. Although, on the one hand, we assume this
taxonomy well-suited for analysing technology policy in an evolutionary context, on the other
hand, it appears somewhat crude, especially regarding the characteristics Ergas identifies in
order to assign a specific innovation system to one or the other policy design. To surmount
these critics, we suggest to take a closer look at the specific policy measures applied. For this
purpose we develop a new classification scheme, based on interviews with political
representatives and suggesting four categories spread out between the technology side (high
and low technological specificity) and the economic side (high and low market distance). This
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scheme allows for more evident comparisons of different innovation systems. For our
discussion we take an evolutionary perspective looking at capabilities of the actors involved,
the processes of technological competition and co-operation as well as the connecting
feedback during the various phases of innovation processes (in a broad sense). We then apply
this concept in an empirical analysis of German technology policy of the last two decades thus
demonstrating the basic procedure of our approach.
2. Theoretical Aspects
Asked for the most important driving forces of economic development, most economists do
not hesitate to state that technical progress is the main source of quantitative economic growth
and qualitative economic change. However, a necessary sequent question is, what kind of
innovative activities can be expected in capitalistic societies, and how can policy support or
even spur such innovation processes? In order to analyse these issues, some economists left
the traditional equilibrium-oriented path of neoclassical economics and turned to an
evolutionary theorising. In particular, they argue that the evolutionary paradigm is more
adequate for analysing development processes initiated within the system, characterised by
strong uncertainty and disequilibrating forces and which is composed of heterogeneous
actors.
1 In this perspective, neoclassical economics oversimplifies the issues of innovation
processes by drawing on a representative agent who attempts to reach an optimal equilibrium
because he acts in a deterministic or quasi-deterministic environment and is endowed with
perfect rationality.
Contrariwise, in an evolutionary context the complexity of interactions between
heterogeneous agents guided by trial-and-error is considerably increased, and a benchmark for
optimal solutions is missing - thus, uncertainty prevails and the optimality of solutions can
only be assessed ex post. Therefore, one has to search for other justifications for policy
interventions than sophisticated but nevertheless simple market failure analysis.
2 Such a new
view on technology policy, although not well-elaborated as yet, will certainly have to be
framed by an understanding of innovation processes as search and experimentation (instead of
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immediate optimisation). Policy measures will then aim at the propelling and sustaining forces
of these processes (instead of not yet achieved optimal solutions).
3
Among these forces, the capability, education, and skills of actors are of foremost
importance.
4 Absorptive capacities
5 and receiver competencies
6 are required for both the
generation and dissemination of technological know-how. In many cases bottlenecks emerge
just here, and any market incentives promoting or restricting innovative activities are
subordinate. Whatever the policy measure, crucial points should be considered, not in a
facultative but in a general and long-lasting manner. This emphasis on non-market factors, of
course, is not to be understood as an argument for the total neglect of markets. Markets are
here to be considered mainly as selective devices for awarding better and penalising worse
technological solutions or performances. Of course in this context policy measures aim at the
functioning of markets and still attempt to prohibit monopolisation - not in a static allocative
sense, but with a dynamic orientation, keeping in mind the role of heterogeneity as the fuel for
technological evolution.
7
Moreover, the evolutionary perspective dispenses with the simple linear-sequential model of
innovation
8, where an exogenous inventive stage is followed by an innovation stage in which
firms can draw on well-defined new technological opportunities, and finally also a diffusion
stage, where the successful innovations spread over the whole economy is no longer adequate.
Instead, some authors draw from the notion of collective invention
9 where actors in different
stages of the innovation process influence each other, to and fro. Thus, in these environments
so-called cross-fertilisation effects
10 additionally propel technological change. Applying this
concept of looped processes
11 to the major innovative actors in an economy, the concepts of
national innovation systems
12 were introduced. There, different actors and institutions (firms,
independent inventors, universities etc.) jointly and individually contribute to the exploration
of new and the exploitation of given technologies. In this perspective, not only risk (i.e. weak
                                                
3 See Metcalfe, J. S. (1995).
4 See Carlsson/Eliasson (1994).
5 Cohen/Levinthal (1989).
6 Eliasson (1990).
7 See e.g. Metcalfe, J. S. (1994).
8 See e.g. Schumpeter, J. A. (1911).
9 Allen (1983).
10 Mokyr, J. (1991), Pyka (1999).
11 Kline, S.J. (1985).
12 See e.g. Nelson (1994), Lundvall (1992).4
uncertainty), but also strong uncertainty
13 necessitates policy intervention in order to support
innovation processes. So, in addition to the question how to provide for venture capital, the
problem of suitable or appropriate structures underlying and supporting these evolutionary
development processes moves into the centre of interest. Here, new trade-offs  have to be
solved, e.g. between heterogeneity as a necessary and rich source of innovation and
standardisation
14, which is, on the one hand, useful for the diffusion of new technologies, but
on the other hand obviously reduces heterogeneity.
From this evolutionary perspective, policy designs now have a straightforward process-
orientation instead of solely repairing market failures which is a target-orientation (bench
mark-based). Following this, the well-known mission- and diffusion-oriented policy designs
may be seen in a different light. Quite obviously, diffusion-oriented policy with its missing
clear target perspective serves more to the aim of sustaining an appropriate degree of
heterogeneity. At the first sight a mission-oriented policy appears quite the contrary, by
favouring one specific development path, this being a severe disadvantage for alternative
technological trajectories. However, one might also argue that mission-oriented policy is able
to bring ex-ante seemingly unrelated technologies together by exploiting cross-fertilisation
effects. In this sense, mission-oriented policy also has to be seen as a policy instrument for
sustaining evolutionary development.
15
Within this analytical and interpretative framework we discuss i) whether the Ergas taxonomy
of technology policy is appropriate for identifying evolutionary policy, ii) based on the
criticism raised we extend the classification using a direct method, and iii) apply this to the
German federal technology policy from 1975 - 1996.
3. Mission- vs. Diffusion-Oriented Policy Design - Some Taxonomical Considerations
In order to judge the efficiency of specific technology policy measure, Ergas (1987) introduces
his often cited taxonomy, where he differs between mission- and diffusion-oriented policy
designs. Following his arguments, a national innovation system is connected to state
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interventions for two main reasons: On the one hand, in nearly all industrialised countries
technology and innovation are promoted due to considerations of national sovereignty and
international competitiveness. On the other hand, technology policy measures are invoked by
the awareness of significant ‘imperfections’ of the market, e.g. among others in neoclassical
terms the public-good nature of technological know-how, and in more evolutionary terms, the
intrinsic uncertainty of innovation processes.
The attribute mission-oriented seems to be justified, in a rough sketch, in those cases of
technology policy, which aim at national sovereignty, e.g. the development and introduction
of new generic technologies. Here a clear target is given and the respective funds are granted
to fulfil specific technological aims. Whereas measures aiming at a broad spreading out of
new know-how, including measures to promote the utilization of this know-how or even the
respective transfer, are classified as diffusion-oriented. Quite typical is the furthering of so-
called key technologies which are assumed to exert positive influence on a broad group of
industries and firms.
Ergas (1987) had already emphasized the rough nature of every taxonomy, because a
classification of countries or even specific technologies to one or the other policy design
obviously disguises single measures which follow the respective other policy design. Anyway,
Ergas (1987, p. 52) claims „But the focus of policy differs in the two groups, and this allows a
clearer examination of the relation between technology policy and innovation performance.“
Although we agree to this statement, in the following we will introduce an alternative to
Ergas’ indirect method which should in a way reduce shortcomings resulting from roughly
classifying whole countries to a specific policy design. However, first, we will take up Ergas’
procedure.
3.1 The Indirect Method
According to Ergas (1987), the technology policy of a country can be classified as mission- or
diffusion-oriented by examining several criteria concerning i) the state of the technology life-
cycle of a specific technology, ii) the share of public funded research institutions as well as
private recipients, iii) the specific design of the educational system, iv) the opportunities for6
co-operative R&D, v) standardisation efforts, and finally vi) the share of military research.
These criteria are applied to a group of seven countries (United States, France, United
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Japan).
With respect to the first criteria, Ergas claims that mission-oriented policy concentrates on a
small number of technologies in an early phase of the technological life cycle. Thus, a specific
feature of mission-oriented measures is concentration: first, only a small number of
technologies is selected for public funding and second, also most often only large corporations
have the adequate infrastructure necessary for these programmes. „A few bets are placed on a
small number of races; but together these bets are large enough to account for a high share of
each country’s total technology development programme.“
16
On the contrary, diffusion-oriented policy aims at a broader spectrum of technologies in a
more advanced phase of the life cycle. In order to distinguish phases of the technology life
cycle Ergas draws on the assumption of declining R&D intensity going hand in hand with
advances in that technology. His results are summarised in table 1.
1980
Country/R&D intensity high medium low
United States 88 8 4
France 91 7 2
United Kingdom 95 3 2
G e r m a n y 6 72 31 0
Sweden 71 20 9
J a p a n 2 11 26 7
Table 1: Public funding for R&D in the high, medium and low R&D intensity industries as respective percentage
of total public funding (approximate estimates); 
a Defined as industries where the ratios of R&D to sales are
respectively more than twice (high intensity), between twice and a half (medium) and less than a half (low) than
those of the manufacturing average. Source: OECD, Ergas, H. (1987), p. 54.
By this Ergas implicitly assumes a direct relationship between the number of furthered
industries or technologies and the specific policy design
17 applied. However, in order to
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classify technology policy the decisive criteria is the design of the specific measure and not
the number of technologies chosen. The indirect procedure neglects this.
According to Ergas’ second criteria, a high share of public funded research performed ‘in-
house’ i.e. by public research institutions is another distinguishing feature of a mission-
oriented policy. For evidence this, the share of public-financed R&D performed within public
institutions is invoked (see table 2).
1983 (%)
France 46,8
United Kingdom (1981) 38,9
Germany 31,6
United States (1981) 25,7
Switzerland (1981) 24,7
Table 2: Share of government-financed R&D carried out within the government-
financed sector; source: OECD, Ergas, H., 1987, p. 58.
Again, this is to be regarded as only a considerably rough procedure, because following Ergas’
definition of mission-oriented policy, it is the specificity of a measure and not the recipient
that is constituent for the respective policy design. So, there are technology policy
programmes aiming at technology transfer including public institutions e.g. universities which
can be clearly classified as diffusion-oriented, as well as programmes aiming at the
development of a specific technology by private firms (e.g. Transrapid in Germany) which are
clearly designed as mission-oriented.
Specific features of a technology policy design following a diffusion orientation can be found
in the structure of the education system, standardisation efforts and the furthering of co-
operative research summarised under the heading decentralisation. As to the education
system, Ergas focuses, on the interdisciplinary character of e.g. engineering schools on the one
hand, and on the other, he emphasises the combination of theoretical knowledge as well as
practical skills, as found e.g. in the German apprenticeship system. „The most significant
feature [of a diffusion-oriented policy] is probably the depth and breadth of investment in
human capital centering in the dual system of education.“
18 In order to guarantee an effective
                                                
18 Ergas (1987), p. 67.8
flow of information and know-how, standardisation can help to reduce the respective
transaction costs.
19 In the same way co-operative R&D including close university-industry
links, as well as formal
20 and informal
21 co-operation within firms are necessary devices for
increasing the pace of the diffusion of new know-how and technologies. With this, Ergas
concentrates on the technological infrastructure
22 responsible for information transfer as well
as the building up of receiver competencies
23 or absorptive capacities
24. Although in most
cases the above mentioned elements are obviously closely connected to a diffusion-
orientation, the reverse conclusion can not necessarily be claimed to hold also. All difficulties
in comparing national education systems aside, many mission-oriented programmes involve
co-operation (e.g. in nuclear fusion private firms as well as public research institutes and
universities are engaged), and sometimes they even take the initiative to create a new
prevailing standard (e.g. HDTV). Again as a consequence, a clear-cut classification is
impossible without taking the specific design of a technology policy programme into account.
Finally, Ergas (1987) claims a high share of military R&D as a significant feature of mission-
oriented policy dominated countries. For evidence, he draws on the shares of defence-related









Share of defence-related R&D in government expenditure on R&D, 1981;
Source: OECD, Ergas, H. (1987), p. 54.
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Obviously, military research is mission-oriented par excellence. But it cannot be compared
with most of the civil projects, as very different co-ordination mechanisms are invoked e.g. no
true cost-control etc. Therefore, in the ‘direct method’ to be introduced below, we decide to
neglect these military research expenditures altogether.
With the criteria introduced above, Ergas concludes to characterise countries according to
their respective policy design. So, typical mission-oriented countries are the United States
(high funding of R&D intensive industries, high share of military research), the United
Kingdom (high funding of R&D intensive industries), and France (high funding of R&D
intensive industries, high share of military research). Countries with a dominating diffusion-
oriented policy are Germany (education system, standardisation), Sweden (low share of
defence-related R&D), and Switzerland (low share of defence related R&D, low share of
government in-house R&D).
However, the indicators of this indirect method applied by Ergas cannot give more than a first
and rough idea of the technology policy of a specific country. In order to obtain deeper
insights in the development and structure of technology policy, and thereby still drawing on
the useful taxonomy of mission- and diffusion-oriented policy design, we will introduce a so-
called direct method in the following section.
3.2 The Direct Method
It has already become clear that the indirect procedure by drawing on specific characteristics
of the innovation system can only provide a rough and distorted sketch of technology policy.
Without going into further detail of the design of the specific measures applied any
classification tends to disguise the multifaceted character of technology policy. The direct
method we suggest attempts to avoid these shortcomings by investigating the different
measures separately. Classifying them according to the respective policy design also allows
heterogeneous policy styles.
For the purpose of classification, we introduce the following matrix with one axis describing
the degree of specificity of a policy measure and the other describing the market distance of10
the respective measure.
25 By this we also distinguish basic and applied research, in order to
take the large share the furthering of basic research demands in the public budget of every
industrialised nation into account. In the following we achieve four broader fields of
technology policy (see fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Classification-Matrix
In Basic I we summarise basic research in a narrow sense, meaning there is no commercial
orientation. However, still far away from a market introduction, some specific technologies,
e.g. nuclear fusion are publicly funded. Here, public funding is combined with a certain degree
of technological specificity because a large potential for further development is expected in
these fields. Therefore, we call it Basic II/Vision as the respective technology policy goes hand
in hand with a kind of technological vision or farsightedness or expectation. However, due to
the enormous financial efforts necessary to promote innovation and the intrinsic uncertainty in
these fields, private actors are normally not expected to engage themselves here on their own.
Nevertheless, it is intended to reach higher market vicinity in these fields in the nearer future,
so that these promotion areas can be dismissed in the two areas above. With decreasing
market distance we approach the mission- and diffusion-oriented fields which differ in the
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degree of technological specificity given the single policy interventions. A low degree of
technological specificity allows for a broad field of heterogeneous technologies to be furthered
in a diffusion-oriented style, whereas this heterogeneity is constrained by increasing
specificity following a mission-oriented policy design.
4. Empirics
The direct method introduced above we be applied in the following section to data describing
the technology policy of Germany over the last two decades. Before presenting the empirical
results, we will first briefly introduce the data we draw on and introduce the respective criteria
we apply to classify the specific policy measures to the one or the other policy style. Thus,
remaining shortcomings, which are unavoidably also associated with the direct method, are
also worked out.
4.1 Database
Our data are taken from the annual issues of the Ministry of Research and Technology
(BMBF) for the years 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1997. From these we use table
8 as a coherent and topic-oriented scheme out of part VII (Statistics): "Ausgaben des Bundes
für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Entwicklung nach Förderbereichen und Förderschwer-
punkten" (state expenditures on science, research and development classified by areas and
main subjects). The numbers delivered are the aggregated expenditures of the "Bund" for
single promoting measures (or ministries) where a further sub-division within the main
subject is not provided. Since not all data are available for the whole period under
investigation (1975-1996) and because the statistics of 1984 is based on a different
classification, the missing values are approximated by appropriate measures.  For 1997 there
are no actual data available yet so that the planned numbers were taken.12
4.2 Criteria of Classification
In order to systematise the specific expenditures with respect to basic research, mission-
oriented policy design, diffusion-oriented policy design and also some indirect promotion
measures as a subgroup of diffusion-oriented policy, criteria of classification have to be
defined. For this purpose in part 3 of the annual report the specific promotion areas and main
promotion subjects are evaluated with respect to their objective, the results achieved so far
and the applied measures. For this evaluation specific criteria were elaborated and adjusted in
personal interviews with the persons in charge at the Federal Ministry of Research and
Technology. The specific areas are classified, according to the following criteria:
a) For basic research we follow the OECD definition  "Basic research is the experimental or
theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation
of phenomena and observable facts without any particular application or use in view."
Moreover, the institutional promotion of research institutions within specific promotion areas
are also classified as basic research, e.g. within the field agriculture, wood and fishery (R)
26
the promotion of the BML (ministry of agriculture) of the ‘Bundesforschungsanstalt für
Landwirtschaft’ (public institute for research in agriculture) in Braunschweig is summarised.
b) A diffusion-oriented policy design is found when specific promotion measures apply to
certain technology fields without a detailed specification of technological aims because e.g.
they have an important strategic component or are supposed to be so-called key-technologies
with respect to international competitiveness. E.g. in the promotion area L1 ‘new materials’,
from a technical point of view, no clear technological objective of the research is specified.
Moreover, all measures attempting to accelerate technology transfer are defined as a diffusion-
oriented policy design. Additionally, the institutional promotion A3 of the Fraunhofer
Gesellschaft (FhG) is taken into account with its specific objective as sustaining applied
research and technology transfers from the basic research. Drawing back on Ergas again, the
main characteristic of this kind of technology policy is decentralisation.
c) We think of indirect promotion measures as either
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- technology unspecified measures for R&D in firms (e.g. potential oriented measures, such as
T1) or
- technology specific measures to further broad application and diffusion of so-called key
technologies (e.g. Information Technology T3).
Moreover, we count as indirect measures the main promotion area U ‘Fachinformation’
(‘specific information’) which mainly contains measures to improve the informational
infrastructure and the main research area W ‘Technikfolgenabschätzung’ (‘consequences of
new technologies’) because in a broad sense both areas serve to further R&D decisions of
firms. Indirect policy measures in a somewhat broader definition belong to the diffusion-
oriented policy design because decentralisation is also the main characteristic.
d) We classify all measures that further concretely specified technological objectives (e.g.
magnetic levitation train Transrapid N) as mission-oriented policy design. Examples for this
are also certain national prestige projects, projects which are undertaken under the heading of
sovereignty and projects with have a more or less military objective (e.g. nuclear research E3,
aeronautics, and hypersonics). According to Ergas (1987), the main characteristic of this
policy type is centralisation of decision-making.
4.3 The problem of inclusion
Our classification is not acceptable without particular qualifications. Especially for
performing an international comparison, certain problems of inclusion must be taken into
account. The following main problems to be considered are:
a)  The level of decision in technology policy: Depending on the hierarchic position of any
decision maker, every R&D policy measure can be classified as one or the other policy
design. On the level of those decision makers who decide on the distribution of funds, the
policy measure would be classified rather as a mission-oriented policy design; contrariwise
on the level of the ministry the same policy measure will be classified as a diffusion-
oriented or still mission-oriented one.14
b) The impact of international projects: A number of R&D promotions are funded on the
international level (in Europe on the EU level in particular). A classification of these
promotion measures into one or the other policy design is quite difficult; in some projects
specific countries are only involved by spending money without gaining any influence on
the design of the project; in another project decisions are made by several parties each with
equal rights; in a third one only the country under consideration has the lead in a certain
project.
c) Policy mix: As the statistics we use show a relatively high aggregation level within certain
policy areas, there are several measures showing a high proportion of rather mission-
oriented design whereas others tend to be diffusion-oriented. An unequivocal classification
is impossible on this level of aggregation. In those cases the aggregate is classified to the
policy design in which the main measures are classified.
5. Results
- policy portfolio
In order to give a first idea of the topography of German technology policy we first draw back
on the matrix of fig. 1 introduced above and fill it with data of the most recent (reliable) year
1996 of our database. The different promotion areas are reflected as bubbles where the size of
the bubble represents the financial amount invested. This illustration already gives a first hint
on the design of policy of this year. The largest share of expenditures of technology policy is
located in the fields with high market distance, i.e. those fields representing basic research.
Also it becomes obvious that in Germany policy is guided by the vision of large development
potentials for space technologies (here also the commitment in multinational programmes as
ESA have to be mentioned), as well as nuclear fusion and biotechnologies, where the latter
more and more gains in market vicinity. The bulk of expenditures, nevertheless is located in
pure basic research in the first quadrant e.g. financing of universities, Max-Planck-
Organisations etc. A look at the upper two areas of technology policy reveals a diffusion-
orientation of German technology policy for the year 1996. The bulk of measures is located in
the quadrant with a low technological specificity. Besides the ‘indirect measures’, which
demand a large part of the diffusion-oriented policy measures, also so-called new technologies15
e.g. ‘new materials’, ‘information and communication technologies’ etc. are located here and
are designed without prescribing specific technological features or aims. The large promotion
areas with clear technological targets, the mission-oriented fields are ‘nuclear power’,
‘hypersonic’ and ‘environmental technologies’, the first two are also characterised by
declining financial budgets in the course of time. From this we conclude the diffusion-
orientation to be an intended goal of the design of policy measures in Germany.
Fig. 2: Classification-Matrix for 1996
- Basic research funding versus technology policy in a narrow sense
In a second step we draw back on our time series of the last 20 years to show the development






























































occupy. The following figures are made comparable by deflating them with prices of 1991
taken from the report of the ‘Sachverständigenrat’ (1996). In order to get an idea about the
significance of measures aiming at basic or applied research - according to the vertical axis of
our classification matrix describing market vicinity - in fig. 3 we summarised the applied
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Fig. 3: Development of expenditures according to market vicinity
For the first 10 years of the period observed technology policy located in the basic research
areas almost amount 50% of total technology policy, since 1985 this share is even increasing
to about 60%. The sharp increase since 1991 is initiated by the German re-unification,
demanding large efforts in order to re-structure the institutional research in the ‘Neue
Bundesländer’. These figures underline our additional classification differing between a high
and low market vicinity, avoiding distortions of immediately including funds for basic
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Fig. 4: Development of expenditures in mission-, diffusion-oriented and indirect measures
- Mission- versus diffusion-orientation
To work out the dominating orientation of technology policy in Germany we look at the time
series describing the development of funds in the specific policy designs shown in fig. 4.
Here, we find a clear dominance of an mission-orientation until the early 90’s, which in a way
contradicts Ergas’ classification of Germany as a diffusion-oriented country. Of course, the
Ergas result is a relative one, where Germany is compared to other countries. Our result is
based on comparing the absolute values in Germany. But this accepted, it nevertheless is quite
remarkable that the share of mission-oriented policy has declined so considerably.
During the years of decline of mission-oriented means, the amount of public funds invested in
areas such as ‘nuclear power’, ‘hypersonics’ and other mission-oriented fields claimed for the
largest shares of public support. However, two developments show a distinct increase in
policy measures designed according to the diffusion-oriented policy style. Besides (i) the
immediate diffusion-oriented promotion areas, which overtake the mission-oriented measures
in seize in 1991, also (ii) indirect measures, such as the building up of a technological










1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
mission diffusion and indirect
share
Fig. 5: Relative shares of  mission- and diffusion-oriented policy
If we add indirect and diffusion-oriented measures we come closer to Ergas’ original
classification made in 1987. In fig. 5 the respective relative shares of these two broad
categories - diffusion-oriented plus indirect and mission-oriented - are depicted. It becomes
visible that the dominance of mission-oriented policy ended already in 1986. So, since the mid
80’s an overall diffusion-orientation of German technology policy can be claimed.
Additionally, there is a growing trend of the dominance of diffusion-oriented policy measures
still lasting since the mid of the 90’s. This increasing dominance can be traced back to new
promotion areas like ‘new materials’, ‘information and communication technologies’ etc., in
which the design of the policy instruments more and more gives up the aim of prescribing
technological specificities, leaving it to the creativity of market and non-market actors. Taking
this development one may ask for the reasons of this policy change. Of course, political
reasons (e.g. nuclear power) are to be taken into account. However, furthering diffusion and
thus heterogeneity is always an appropriate measure, when the policy makers do not have a
clear idea about the direction of further development. However, the insight that the
innovativness of a country depends on collective innovation, too, might also have induced this
policy shift. In this sense policy does not have to lead the development but only to manage it -
or only to be one actor in the collective process.
- Collective invention
Finally, our data allow to test Ergas hypothesis of co-operative R&D as a significant feature of
diffusion-oriented policy design. Within the single promotion areas, the ‘Förderkatalog’ of the
BMBF also gives information about the recipients of public funds and whether the research19








Fig.6: Shares of co-operative measures 1996
In figure 6 the respective shares of co-operative R&D classified to the different policy styles
are depicted. Whereas the share of co-operative R&D in the fields of basic research and
mission-oriented policy measures are comparatively low, together they claim only about one
quarter of all funded co-operative projects, the bulk of co-operative research projects can be
found in within the group of diffusion-oriented policy measures. Accordingly, with respect to
the number of co-operations, Ergas’ criterion seems to be adequate. However, if this number
is weighted with the amount of money spent for single measures, the situation changes
significantly especially favouring  large-scale basic-research projects.
6. Conclusions
For the classification of technology policy in an evolutionary framework the taxonomy to
differ between mission- and diffusion-oriented policy design introduced by Ergas (1987) is
useful. In particular this scheme gives a clue whether the policy orientation aims at the
realisation of specific goals, thereby neglecting the development potentials arising out of
heterogeneous technological approaches, or accepted to be an only imperfect informed actor
in an overall search and experimentation process guided by the creativity of a multitude of20
actors, which also means however, to be permanently threatened by failure. Anyway, Ergas’
indirect method is only able to give a first and crude insight of the technology policy of a
specific country. Therefore, we developed a so-called direct method aiming at a sound
characterisation of single policy measures and giving a more detailed picture about policy
orientation. By applying this direct method on data describing German technology policy over
the last 20 years, we outlined a significant reorientation in the design of policy measures. In
the most recent years a clear dominance of a diffusion-orientation in technology policy in
Germany can be stated, which also gives a hint on a kind of policy learning. Whereas up to
the mid 80’s large-scale mission-oriented programmes were in the centre of interest,
significant problems and failures in these promotion areas lead to an increasing emphasis on
diffusion-oriented and indirect measures.
In this respect also the idea of mission-oriented programmes to spur intentionally cross-
fertilisation has to be carefully interpreted. Although the amalgamation of specific
technological trajectories and/or fields of sciences is intended, issuing such a policy neglects
the specific demands of technological development emphasised by evolutionary economics. It
is the technological heterogeneity and the interplay of different actors in innovation and
diffusion processes which constitutes the cultural and technological evolution. In this respect,
mission-oriented programmes unavoidably have to restrict themselves on ex-ante chosen
technologies, thereby neglecting consequences of the contingencies going hand in hand with
true uncertainty of innovation processes.
In a way the emphasis on heterogeneity of diffusion-oriented policy measures is furthering
both: competition, as a selection process between different technological approaches, as well
as creating an environment in which cross-fertilisation and with it, the emergence of new
technological opportunities can spread out. Therefore and contrary to Ergas’ assumption, these
measures also concentrate on early phases of the technological life cycle, whereas mission-
oriented policy measures aim on technologies in the mid of the technological life-cycle by
trying to succeed in getting technological standards accepted in those technological fields
which have proven to be successful.21
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